Secret, verifiable auctions from elections

Elizabeth A. Quaglia & Ben Smyth (2018) Secret, verifiable auctions from elections. Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 730, pp. 44-92.



Auctions and elections are seemingly disjoint. Nevertheless, similar cryptographic primitives are used in both domains. For instance, mixnets, homomorphic encryption and trapdoor bit-commitments have been used by state-of-the-art schemes in both domains. These developments have appeared independently. For example, the adoption of mixnets in elections preceded a similar adoption in auctions by over two decades. In this paper, we demonstrate a relation between auctions and elections: we present a generic construction for auctions from election schemes. Moreover, we show that the construction guarantees secrecy and verifiability, assuming the underlying election scheme satisfies analogous security properties. We demonstrate the applicability of our work by deriving auction schemes from the Helios family of election schemes. Our results advance the unification of auctions and elections, thereby facilitating the progression of both domains.

Bibtex Entry

	author = "Elizabeth A. Quaglia and Ben Smyth",
	title = "Secret, verifiable auctions from elections",
	year = "2018",
	journal = "Theoretical Computer Science",
	volume = "730",
	pages = "44--92",
	doi = "10.1016/j.tcs.2018.03.022",