key: 2007-attacking-anonymity-in-Direct-Anonymous-Attestation
type: inproceedings
title: "Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA): Ensuring privacy with corrupt administrators"
authors:
  - Ben Smyth
  - Mark D. Ryan
  - Liqun Chen
year: 2007
month: 7
booktitle: "ESAS'07: 4th European Workshop on Security and Privacy in Ad hoc and Sensor Networks"
series: LNCS
volume: "4572"
pages: 218--231
publisher: Springer
doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-73275-4_16
description: >-
  This paper presents a vulnerability in the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol which claims to
  protect user's privacy in the context of trusted computing.
keywords: >-
  Direct Anonymous Attestation, DAA, trusted computing, Trusted Platform Module, TPM,
  user-controlled anonymity, anonymity, privacy, ProVerif, applied pi calculus
abstract: >-
  The Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme provides a means for remotely authenticating a
  trusted platform whilst preserving the user's privacy. The protocol has been adopted by the
  Trusted Computing Group (TCG) in the latest version of its Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
  specification. In this paper we show DAA places an unnecessarily large burden on the TPM host. We
  demonstrate how corrupt administrators can exploit this weakness to violate privacy. The paper
  provides a fix for the vulnerability. Further privacy issues concerning linkability are identified
  and a framework for their resolution is developed. In addition an optimisation to reduce the
  number of messages exchanged is proposed.
supersededby:
  - key: 2012-Direct-Anonymous-Attestation-privacy-definition
    text: journal version
links:
  - file: Smyth07-attacking-DAA.LNCS.pdf
    text: Conference paper
  - file: Smyth07-attacking-DAA.pdf
    text: Extended version
  - url: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73275-4_16
    text: Official version