key: 2010-verifiability-definition-for-electronic-voting
type: inproceedings
title: Election verifiability in electronic voting protocols
authors:
  - Steve Kremer
  - Mark D. Ryan
  - Ben Smyth
year: 2010
month: 9
booktitle: "ESORICS'10: 15th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security"
series: LNCS
volume: "6345"
pages: 389--404
publisher: Springer
doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_24
description: >-
  This paper presents a symbolic definition of election verifiability for a large class of
  electronic voting protocols in the context of the applied pi calculus.
keywords: >-
  electronic voting, e-voting, election verifiability, end-to-end verifiability, individual
  verifiability, universal verifiability, eligibility verifiability, applied pi calculus, FOO, JCJ,
  Civitas, Helios
abstract: >-
  We present a formal, symbolic definition of election verifiability for electronic voting protocols
  in the context of the applied pi calculus. Our definition is given in terms of boolean tests which
  can be performed on the data produced by an election. The definition distinguishes three aspects
  of verifiability: individual, universal and eligibility verifiability. It also allows us to
  determine precisely which aspects of the system's hardware and software must be trusted for the
  purpose of election verifiability. In contrast with earlier work our definition is compatible with
  a large class of electronic voting schemes, including those based on blind signatures, homomorphic
  encryption and mixnets. We demonstrate the applicability of our formalism by analysing three
  protocols: FOO, Helios 2.0, and Civitas (the latter two have been deployed).
links:
  - file: Smyth10-definition-verifiability.LNCS.pdf
    text: Conference paper
  - file: Smyth10-definition-verifiability.pdf
    text: Technical Report
  - file: Smyth10-Birmingham-Brief-electronic-verifiability.pdf
    text: Press release
  - file: Smyth10-definition-verifiability.poster.pdf
    text: Poster
  - url: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15497-3_24
    text: Official version