@techreport{Smyth11-attacking-ballot-secrecy-in-electronic-voting,
  author = {Ben Smyth and Véronique Cortier},
  title = {{A note on replay attacks that violate privacy in electronic voting schemes}},
  year = {2011},
  month = {June},
  number = {RR-7643},
  institution = {INRIA},
  url = {https://publications.bensmyth.com/2011-attacking-ballot-secrecy-in-electronic-voting/},
  url-pdf = {https://publications.bensmyth.com/files/Smyth11-attacking-electronic-voting.pdf},
  url-bib = {https://publications.bensmyth.com/files/Smyth11-attacking-ballot-secrecy-in-electronic-voting.bib},
  url-yaml = {https://publications.bensmyth.com/files/Smyth11-attacking-ballot-secrecy-in-electronic-voting.yml},
  url-md = {https://publications.bensmyth.com/files/Smyth11-attacking-electronic-voting.md},
  note = {INRIA Archive version: http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00599182},
  keywords = {ballot independence, ballot secrecy, privacy, replay attack, vulnerability, exploit, Helios, electronic voting, RR-7643, inria-00599182},
  abstract = {In our previous work, we have shown that the Helios 2.0 electronic voting protocol does not satisfy ballot independence and exploit this weakness to violate privacy; in particular, the Helios scheme is shown to be vulnerable to a replay attack. In this note we examine two further electronic voting protocols - namely, the schemes by Sako \& Kilian and Schoenmakers - that are known not to satisfy ballot independence and demonstrate replay attacks that violate privacy.}
}