We discover insecure voting systems can be proven to satisfy definitions of verifiability and conclude they are unsuitable for the analysis of voting systems.
We explore definitions of verifiability by Juels et al. (2010), Cortier et al. (2014), and Kiayias et al. (2015). We discover that voting systems vulnerable to attacks can be proven to satisfy each of those definitions and conclude they are unsuitable for the analysis of voting systems. Our results will fuel the exploration for a new definition.
@article{Smyth22-surveying-election-verifiability,
title = {{Surveying definitions of election verifiability}},
year = {2022}, author = {Ben Smyth and Michael R. Clarkson}, doi = {10.1016/j.ipl.2022.106267},
url = {./},
url-pdf = {./files/surveying-election-verifiability.pdf},
url-bib = {./files/surveying-election-verifiability.bib},
url-yaml = {./files/surveying-election-verifiability.yml}
}